- The author is an American scholar.
ISTANBUL
Now that we are more than a month into Donald Trump’s second stint as US president, trends that will shape Türkiye-US relations over the coming years are beginning to coalesce. Trump has already shocked governments around the world, but for Türkiye, the most important surprise may be his reorientation of US foreign policy towards Russia and away from Europe.
The stage was set last month, when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in the Saudi capital for discussions about Ukraine at the exact same time that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Trump had been gushing for weeks about how much money Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman will send to the US [1], but President Erdogan provided a new message for observers: Immediately before hosting President Zelenskyy, President Erdogan embarked on a whirlwind tour of key Southeast Asian countries. The trip’s most notable image was President Erdogan’s holding an umbrella for Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto [2]. Lest anyone think that was just a random act necessitated by the weather, President Erdogan then purposefully repeated the motif with President Zelenskyy, and enabled photographers to photograph the same pose both with and without the umbrella [3].
Trumpian diplomacy
Since Trump’s inauguration, many observers have characterized Rubio’s role as the “good cop” or as a “balancer” to Trump’s extremism. Rubio, however, made clear that Trump is the “decider” and the State Department, including the secretary of state, would function merely as emissary for Trump’s foreign policy preferences [4]. Those who do not “faithfully implement the president’s policy” will be ejected from Foggy Bottom [5].
Trump’s first administration was not different: when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson did not prove to be a yes-man, Trump replaced him with Mike Pompeo, who was. Trump cycled through four national security advisors, too. Anyone who resisted Trump’s instincts — including an arch neo-conservative like John Bolton — was shown the door. So it appears that Rubio’s main task for as long as he remains secretary will be cleaning up the messes that Trump, the bull in the china shop of international relations, creates [6].
The situation in Congress
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Congress’ most influential forum concerning foreign policy, remains a platform for powerful Senate figures’ anti-Türkiye rhetoric. Resumption of Republican Senate control made Republican Idaho Senator Jim Risch the committee chairperson once again. With former New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez now in prison, New Hampshire Democrat Jeanne Shaheen inherited the Ranking Member position, the committee’s co-chair from the minority party [7].
Though Rubio and Menendez are no longer present, the committee’s initial meetings under its new leadership showed that bipartisan anti-Türkiye sentiment remains an ingrained problem. During Rubio’s Jan. 15 confirmation hearing, for example, Maryland Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen expressed support for the umbrella group that includes the Syrian wing of the PKK terror group, known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), by repeating the narrative that Americans have been indoctrinated with over the past ten years, that the SDF is America’s ally in the fight against Daesh (ISIS).
Van Hollen also referenced the legislation that he and South Carolina Republican Senator Lindsey Graham introduced threatening sanctions against Türkiye if the Syrian National Army (SNA) continues operations against the SDF. Rubio responded by stating specifically that America’s interest was in exploring what “opportunities that exist” in Syria for the US, and that even what was stated in the hearing concerning Syria, the SDF, and US interests in Syria should be taken as a warning to President Erdogan [8].
- Think tank support for bipartisan misinformation
In mid-February, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Syria [9]. Jeanne Shaheen submitted three external documents as evidence, including a statement from the SDF’s leader, arguing that Türkiye should not have control over Northeast Syria. Both witnesses at the hearing were from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) [10]. Michael Singh claimed that Türkiye intended to “seize territory and target Kurdish fighters,” again echoing talking points that most US commentators have used for the past decade. The other witness, Dana Stroul, averred that there is “no alternative to the US military and its local partner, the SDF” for defeating Daesh.
After the opening statements, Democratic Senator from Delaware Chris Coons asked both witnesses whether US forces in northeastern Syria could be withdrawn. Stroul replied that if US forces were withdrawn and the SNA and Türkiye continued operations against the SDF, the SDF would then change its focus away from controlling Daesh, ominously implying that Damascus’ or Ankara’s involvement would allow Daesh to once again target the US. Risch then expressed his view that withdrawing US soldiers from Syria is something that simply is not on the table and would not happen. Later in the session, Risch would also refer to Türkiye as an “alleged” ally.
Shaheen then asked for comments about Türkiye’s potential role in northeastern Syria. Stroul’s first comments were purposefully misleading: she referred to a moment in 2014, more than ten years ago, in order to claim that Türkiye’s military did not have the capacity to deal with the Daesh issue [11]. The incident that she referred to occurred before Fethullah Gulen’s terror cult attempted a coup against the Turkish government in July 2016, and at a point when the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) still exercised a crippling influence in the Turkish military, especially on the border with Syria. Since July 2016, however, honest observers will attest to how effectively Türkiye’s military has operated in uprooting and subduing Daesh in northern Syria.
Stroul continued to assert that Türkiye “does not have the forces” needed to oversee the Daesh prisons in northeastern Syria. That statement is patently inaccurate and leaves one wondering what her real intentions (or sources of information) were. As all of the senators know, Türkiye has NATO’s second-largest military, and Türkiye’s military forces have a proven anti-terror record in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Syria, and the Horn of Africa. Stroul then made a single positive comment by recognizing Türkiye’s concerns about the SDF and its connections to the PKK, terming those concerns “legitimate,” but she also worked to maintain the fictional separation between the SDF and the PKK.
- In sum, more of the same
Two main themes emerge from both Rubio’s confirmation hearing and the committee session on Syria. First, no one on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee questions US support for the SDF, which is an organic branch of the PKK, a US-designated terrorist organization. In the nearly six hours of combined commentary from the sessions described above, not a single word questioning the SDF’s actual status was uttered.
Second, when it comes to Türkiye, group thinking still dominates the Washington political dialogue. All of the statements about Türkiye from committee members, whether Democrat or Republican, reflected that attitude. All of the members who mentioned Türkiye did so in a negative manner, casting Türkiye as an obstacle to US interests.
In fact, the WINEP session’s characteristics — inaccurate statements received as truth, answers to “softball” questions that were met by the committee chair with comments like “good answer,” and a general atmosphere of reinforcing preconceived attitudes — leave the impression of a casual conversation among acquaintances who already know, more-or-less, what will be said. The senators use the forum to make statements clearly aimed at their local voters. The informal comments made during the session, and the facial expressions and body language of aides lining the chamber make clear that the participants know each other. Singh appeared before the committee before and Stroul previously worked for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a staff member, so she is personally acquainted with most of the members [12]. The session thus becomes a ritual, carried out for public consumption and decorum.
What can Türkiye do?
In the end, as Marco Rubio made clear, the only person who truly matters for foreign policy decisions in the Trump era is Trump himself. And Trump looks to be even more determined to force US institutions to bend to his will.
Subsequently, the Democratic senators also used the WINEP session to express frustration with the Trump administration’s activities in his their first weeks. The Republican senators, on the other hand, had all deserted the session well before it ended. The only Republican who stayed until the conclusion was Risch, the committee chair.
Misinformation and anti-Türkiye sentiment remain entrenched in Washington’s foreign policy circles. While Trump’s personal relationship with Erdogan may offer an alternative diplomatic channel, it is not enough. Türkiye’s policymakers and diplomatic community must take proactive steps to counter these narratives, ensuring that accurate information reaches key decision-makers, particularly in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
[1] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-says-ask-saudi-arabia-invest-1-trillion-us-wide- ranging-davos-ad-rcna188964
[2] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-endonezyada/3478633
[3] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/pg/foto-galeri/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ukrayna-devlet-baskani-zelenskiy-i-cumhurbaskanligi-kulliyesinde-kabul-etti - https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ukrayna-devlet-baskani-zelenskiy-ile-gorustu/3485452
[4] Rubio’s Secretary of State candidacy testimony in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3sl7TtBUjl
[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/12/us/politics/trump-foreign-service.html
[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/20/us/politics/rubio-russia-europe.html
[7] https://www.foreign.senate.gov
[8] The exchange begins at the three-hour mark of the video referenced in Footnote 4.
[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIn1FSMvb5g
[10] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org - This think tank is understood as pro-Israel and was founded partially through the support of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee: https://merip.org/1993/01/money- media-and-policy-consensus/
[11] This exchange begins at the session’s 54-minute mark.
[12] https://www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography/Article/2539910/dana-stroul
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.
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