By Dr. Adam McConnel
ISTANBUL
On Tuesday, Donald Trump confirmed rumors that had been swirling for several days, that Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil’s CEO, would be his choice for secretary of state. Tillerson emerged as a candidate only in the past two weeks; previously most attention had been focused on names like Rudy Giuliani, John Bolton, or Mitt Romney.
The first thing to state is that Tillerson is more appealing than the neoconservative, anti-U.N. Bolton, or the hysterical Giuliani. But at this point it’s difficult to say anything much more positive than that. Tillerson has never held any political responsibilities before, so it is not possible for anyone to predict what his foreign policy stances may look like in the months ahead.
That is, if Tillerson is confirmed by the senate. Tillerson’s long career at Exxon and his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin are causing widespread concern in the U.S., and not just among Democrats. Prominent Republicans, such as Arizona Senator and former presidential candidate John McCain, have expressed strong doubts about Tillerson’s apparent closeness to Putin, who awarded the CEO the Russian state’s Order of Friendship in 2013. Nevertheless, one of the figures that apparently recommended Tillerson to Trump was former Secretary of State James Baker. Expectations are that Tillerson’s Senate confirmation hearings will not be a walk in the park, and that especially Tillerson’s personal interests and relationship with Putin will receive close scrutiny.
The person that Tillerson immediately reminded me of, in terms of appearance and professional background upon being named state secretary, was Edward Stettinius. Stettinius, who also sported a silver mane and a warm personality, earned his industrial experience in the automotive and steel sectors, and began civil service in the 1930s during the New Deal. In late 1944, Franklin Delano Roosevelt replaced the ailing Secretary of State Cordell Hull with Stettinius largely so that Stettinius could oversee the foundational United Nations session in April-June 1945. That task required a deal-making people-person, and that’s why Harry Truman did not replace Stettinius with James Byrnes until after the successful conclusion of that first U.N. meeting. Stettinius then became the first U.S. ambassador to the U.N. In 1946, as the Cold War began to take shape, Stettinius would resign from his post to protest the Truman administration’s attitude towards the Soviet Union.
But Tillerson’s similarity to Stettinius ends with personal appearance and corporate background. Tillerson is a Republican whose relationship with Russia stems from corporate oil interests, whereas Stettinius was a New Deal Democrat who fell out with Harry Truman over foreign policy. Stettinius’s background in industrial manufacturing helped him contribute to New Deal programs and then to the economic side of fighting WWII. Tillerson’s career with Exxon has illustrated a willingness to pursue agreements with foreign governments that directly contradict U.S. policy or interests. If Tillerson is confirmed, the main concern, until proven otherwise, will be whether Tillerson is able to discern where his petroleum-focused worldview ends and U.S. interests begin, and whether he will act appropriately when contradictions between the two occur.
For Ankara, the question of where Turkey fits into Tillerson’s worldview will immediately achieve utmost importance. Tillerson’s life has been devoted to oil for 40 years, but Turkey has little oil, small amounts of natural gas, and is largely dependent on energy imports despite efforts to diversify the country’s energy options.
Just as worrying, Tillerson’s relationship with Putin places him in a grey area diplomatically. President Erdogan generally goes straight to President Putin now because current Secretary of State John Kerry’s relevance and ability to affect developments in Turkey’s region has steadily evaporated over the past several years. Will Tillerson’s position ultimately facilitate or hinder U.S. relations with Turkey, and Turkey’s relations with Moscow? The thought that continually inspires worry is oil: if Tillerson continues to put oil before diplomacy and U.S. interests, Turkey may continue to experience the difficulties with the U.S. that it encountered in the past four years.
Those worries are on the diplomatic level. On a more day-to-day level, Tillerson has also experienced intensive interactions with a number of other states in Turkey’s region because of his job. That history may provide bridges to Turkey’s policy perspective. According to a New York Times report, for example, Exxon has good relations with Qatar. Turkey recently established a military base in Qatar and generally shares similar views with the Qatari leadership on regional issues. More intriguingly, one of Tillerson’s most controversial deals affects Turkey’s immediate regional interests.
In 2011 Exxon Mobil, under Tillerson’s leadership and despite criticism from Baghdad and the Obama administration, signed an agreement with Erbil to produce oil from Northern Iraqi fields. That deal has since provided badly needed income for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).
Northern Iraq, only 10 years ago, was a source of angst for Turkish politicians. But in that time span, Masoud Barzani’s decision to abandon militant violence and become a politician devoted to developing his country’s future created a welcome ally. Barzani’s KRG government shares Ankara’s concern about other violent militant groups in the region, such as the PKK/PYD or Daesh, and about Tehran’s influence over Iraq’s central government. Erbil is also on the same page in the effort to roll back Tehran’s project to create a proxy- and ally-controlled corridor from Northern Iraq to the Mediterranean. The KRG is struggling to stay on its feet as Iran attempts to destabilize it, and the deal with Exxon has helped the KRG to persevere. All of these factors contribute to the KRG’s plans to open a representative office in Ankara, which has been rumored for many months now. For its part, Turkey has had a consul general in Erbil since 2010.
Ankara must look favorably upon Exxon’s agreement with the KRG because the income helps stabilize a regional actor with democratic aspirations. A developing democracy in Northern Iraq that is able to provide security and better life standards to its residents constitutes a counter-weight to the PKK/PYD and their Marxist-nationalist ideology, as well as to Tehran and its theological regime. Northern Iraq’s relationship with Baghdad will also continue to be contentious in the near future. These issues may provide starting points of mutual interest and agreement between Tillerson and Ankara.
In the end, because Tillerson’s foreign policy views are unknown, we will all have to wait for his first contacts with Ankara’s Foreign Ministry and with other regional states. Even though various Republicans are upset with Trump’s choice for Secretary of State, no Presidential appointment has been rejected since 1989. Unless a surprise happens, we will see a Secretary Tillerson visiting Ankara soon.
* Opinions expressed in this piece are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu Agency's editorial policy.
