By Hussian Abdul Hussain
WASHINGTON DC
An end to the Gulf crisis seemed imminent with the visit last week of Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to Washington, and after his meeting with President Donald Trump.
The American-Kuwaiti summit had barely been concluded when Trump called Qatar’s Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, and UAE Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed, encouraging all three to come to terms, and offering to host them in New York or Washington to celebrate their reconciliation.
Qatar’s Tamim thus called Saudi Prince Salman, a phone call that was hailed as a breakthrough towards ending the rift.
Qatar’s media reported that Tamim had initiated the call, thanks to a “coordination effort” by Trump. The Qatari media also reported that the Saudi leader suggested that both countries designate envoys that could come together and discuss how to resolve their outstanding differences.
But optimism proved to be short-lived. Hours after the phone call, Saudi media quoted Riyadh sources as saying that communication between the two countries had been suspended, again, because Qatar and its media had intentionally misled the public, by saying it was Trump who coordinated the call.
The next day, the response to the Saudis came not from Doha, but from Washington, where unnamed administration officials told major U.S. media outlets that Qatari media reports were and that it was, in fact, Trump who coordinated the call.
The Saudis, therefore, stepped back, and changed their narrative, this time accusing the Qataris of “twisting facts” regarding the phone conversation.
They expressed dismay that the Qataris made it look as if it was the Saudi leader who suggested the appointment of envoys to end the conflict.
The Saudis perhaps reasoned that such a statement made Riyadh look as if it was the one seeking reconciliation, which was not the because it should be Qatar that is begging for an end.
The U.S. media not only called the Saudi bluff over “Trump’s coordination,” it also accused the Saudi media of misleading its audience by broadcasting a Daesh statement announcing that the terrorist group supported Qatar in its standoff against Saudi, the UAE, and Egypt.
It turned out that Daesh had never issued such a statement, and that the statement the Saudi media had broadcast was fake.
In less than 24 hours, what looked like a promising breakthrough in the Gulf crisis was falling apart, and relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia seemed to be getting worse, especially with Riyadh reinvigorating its media attacks on its neighbor.
When Kuwait’s Al-Sabah met with Trump, the U.S. president told his guest that he was willing to do what it takes to help resolve the Gulf crisis.
The Kuwaiti guest responded by saying that Washington should show impartiality in such a way that convinces the contending parties that no single one of them can beat its rivals.
Trump said that he would be happy to do so, only if he could guarantee that none of them, including Qatar, financed terrorism.
The Kuwaiti emir said that he would guarantee the Qataris, which prompted Trump to promise to personally call the contending Gulf leaders and bring their quarrel to an end.
The U.S.-Kuwaiti plan seemed to work. The emir of Qatar called the Saudi leader, which made the failure of this -- so far the highest level of mediation -- inexplicable.
It seems that when Trump called the three Gulf leaders, he urged the Qatari sovereign to call both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Doha, however, called Riyadh, but not Abu Dhabi, a step that might have infuriated the Emiratis and prompted them to urge the Saudis to scrap the whole mediation effort.
Trump himself had not included the sovereigns of Bahrain and Egypt in his mediation effort in the first place.
Whether by coincidence or plan, by talking to Saudi Arabia but not to the UAE, Qatar could have split the front, boycotting it by sidelining the Saudis. Qatar’s detractors might have noticed Doha’s plans to make nice with the Saudis only, but not with the other three boycotters. Hence, after the Saudis had accepted mediation, they abandoned and sent the whole process back to square one.
While it seemed perfectly fine for the Saudis to walk back their reconciliation with Qatar, Riyadh, in fact, took a political hit.
Now that he has called all three Gulf leaders, including the Qatari prince, Trump has officially ended his anti-Qatar and has become equidistant. This means that the Saudi-Emirati front against Qatar has lost the only anti-Qatar ally it had inside since the American establishment had -- since day one of the crisis -- insisted on America’s neutrality.
Saudi Arabia has also lost points with the White House. Trump might not be a great political friend, but he remembers and remembers broken promises. By agreeing to end the rift with Qatar, then reneging on the agreement, Riyadh broke its promise to Trump.
The image of Saudi Arabia also took a hit with the U.S. public, now reading U.S. media reports that Saudis had misled their audience by broadcasting false claims, whether about Trump’s coordination and mediation, or the fake Daesh claim of supporting Qatar.
By the time all was said and done, the two parties of the Gulf crisis had retrenched to where they stood before the Kuwaiti visit to Washington. But this time, Doha has neutralized Trump and shown itself willing to end the Gulf crisis, while Riyadh appeared flaky and trying to justify its prolongation of the crisis by citing ambiguous excuses.
A breakthrough in the Gulf crisis mediation fizzled out soon after it had taken place. Qatar improved its position a few inches, Saudi Arabia and the UAE lost a few feet, while the crisis lived to see another day.
*Opinions expressed in this piece are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu Agency's editorial policy.
