- The author is the head of Anadolu's Opinion Desk.
THE HAGUE
Final results from the Dutch elections held on Wednesday, Oct. 29, are not yet in. With 99% of ballots counted, the social liberal D66, which unexpectedly gained ground, and Geert Wilders's Party for Freedom (PVV), known for its anti Muslim and racist positions, are running neck and neck. Even the smallest lead matters, since the party that finishes first will be asked to open coalition talks and will take the political initiative. Because the major parties say they will not enter a coalition with Wilders, a potential PVV lead is widely expected to mean prolonged coalition negotiations.
In a 150-seat parliament, the fact that a party can come first with only 26 seats reveals the fragmentation of Dutch politics. This very fragmented system, with 27 parties, makes a coalition of at least three parties unavoidable. For this reason, many in the Netherlands hope, even by a narrow margin, for a victory by D66 and its 38-year-old leader Rob Jetten. The young leader's surprise surge has raised expectations of a generational change and a political transformation. Jetten's sexual orientation draws attention in commentary in Türkiye, but in the Netherlands, which is the first country to legalize same sex marriage, it carries far less weight within the public.
The far right did not shrink, it fragmented
The Dutch election was watched closely, not only for its domestic impact but for what it means for Europe's political future. Polls suggested the racist leader Geert Wilders would lose support, raising hopes that centrists could regain ground and rebalance a Europe driven by the far right. The results fell short of those expectations. Wilders lost around 18% but remains in the fight for first place. The center-right VVD, which has moved right in recent years, saw only modest losses. The GreenLeft–Labour alliance suffered a major defeat, prompting the resignation of its leader, Frans Timmermans.
In the broader view, voters' reaction to far-right parties looks pragmatic rather than ideological. It seems aimed less at government policy and more at Wilders's refusal to compromise and doubts about his ability to govern. The social-liberal D66 appears to have given voters the confidence they sought with its focus on EU integration and economic stability. By prioritizing digitization, climate policy, women's rights, and personal freedoms, the party mobilized young voters. As a result, voters seem to have moved toward D66's pragmatic, flexible, compromise-minded, middle-of-the-road line; one that balances social welfare with individual rights, institutional reform, and EU integration.
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), which can be considered on the centrist spectrum, increased its seats but fell short of a real breakthrough. At the same time, JA21 and Forum for Democracy (FVD), which maintain a softened but still far-right line with anti-immigration and pro-Israel rhetoric similar to Wilders, also grew their vote shares. Add to this the VVD under Dilan Yesilgoz, which has moved closer to the far right with anti-immigration and openly pro-Zionist positions; given all, it is hard to argue that the far right has receded.
It appears that right-leaning Dutch voters punished the right and far-right parties that helped bring down the old government and showed poor coalition skills, while shifting to untested far-right options such as JA21 and FVD.
This picture shows that the far right has not retreated; rather, it has fragmented and continues to shape the main axis of politics. As in the rest of Europe, the far right in the Netherlands is not only holding its ground; it is also pulling the center-right and center-left into its orbit.
Pragmatic change: A social-liberal government with a center-right counterweight
Based on the numbers so far, center-right parties cannot reach the 76 seats needed to form a government in any formula that leaves Wilders out. Rob Jetten, the young D66 leader and winner of the election, says he is open to all coalition options except one with Wilders. Therefore, a left-leaning coalition is one of the strongest scenarios on the table. But even if D66 brings in the GreenLeft–Labour alliance, it still cannot reach a majority without Dilan Yesilgoz’s VVD, which has a pronounced far-right tilt.
Given the size of the right and far-right electorate, center-right parties, many of which have radicalized under far-right pressure, still look like the system's balancing force. Had the arithmetic allowed D66, the clear political winner, to govern with left parties alone, we could have spoken of a real rupture, even a transformation. However, the current picture makes that unlikely.
The far right is not an imported problem. It is produced, and in some ways nourished, by a system that has failed to cope with demographic and economic pressures and the geopolitical context. Without serious institutional and structural reform, it is wishful thinking to expect major change in European politics and society, which the far right has already reshaped. The genie is out of the bottle; nothing will simply go back to how it was.
The Zeitgeist tilts right, the left is collapsing
The sharp losses of the traditional left in the Netherlands show that voters only give a chance to a left that fits the existing order. In an environment where the ideology of capitalist consumption and pleasure holds every idea hostage, the left's socioeconomic policies find almost no social base. For this reason, it is not the classical and ideological left that claims to transform the system that draws favor. It is the conciliatory and pragmatic liberal left party D66. More broadly, from left to right, from liberal to conservative, European politics is being reshaped around security, defense, and borders.
Europe's long history, which reaches back to feudal orders, reveals how fragile its social and ideological cohesion is in times of crisis, as now. Under the shadow of enduring divides like the Protestant–Catholic-Secular tensions, European societies that are held together mostly by economic prosperity, with little else to unite them, tend to fragment when crises hit. Every political, economic, and social crisis makes the internal fault lines more visible. European society and politics are uneasy. Dutch voters' turn toward D66, a pragmatic party that offered positive and constructive messages throughout the campaign and showed a capacity for compromise rather than rigidity, reflects a search for calm, consensus, and composure.
What is odd and unfortunate is this: political elites and institutions that do not solve real problems, and focus only on their own power and profit, feed on division and polarization to preserve themselves. Europe's political elites have pinned their hopes on this uneasy state of mind and on the Zeitgeist.
This may bother social democrats, but the spirit of the age is tilting to the right not only in Europe but across the world. Yet whether on the right or the left, a technocratic world of elites, media, and bureaucracy that ignores public concerns cannot solve today's problems. Europe needs a deep political and intellectual transformation to break this deadlock.
What do the results mean for Türkiye?
Whatever government formula emerges from the Dutch elections, cooperation with Türkiye will be strategically important for any Cabinet. Türkiye has become an indispensable actor in global balances through its rising defense capacity, its mediation in conflict zones, and its strategic weight within NATO. No Cabinet scenario will risk relations with Ankara. Tellingly, Türkiye was almost never a point of contention during the campaign.
The growing entrenchment of the far right may create potential problems for Turks living in the Netherlands. Even so, the far right is essentially Europe's internal issue, because it is a problem produced within the system itself. Economic crises, loss of prosperity, and social insecurity caused by years of policy choices are often blamed on immigrants, Muslims, and Turks. In truth, they stem from Europe's own systemic crisis.
The Dutch Turkish community, which is targeted by aggressive identity politics and the populism of the far-right and racist circles, is one of the most integrated immigrant groups. It has the institutional capacity, internal resilience, and sense of identity to withstand these pressures, and it continues to contribute to the Netherlands' internal stability. All this shows that those who should be most concerned about the normalization of radical extremes in Europe are Europeans themselves.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.
