The writer is an Associate Professor of History at Indiana University South Bend.
ISTANBUL
In the case of a severe conflict, the logic of the narratives is pretty clear and simplistic. Here, the “bad” guy is different from the “good” guys. Still, often, a closer analysis might indicate that the “bad” chap’s behavior is almost a carbon copy of the behavior of his “good” counterpart. Consequently, the “good” chap’s behavior could well explain the operational model of his counterpart. This could be seen in the current Russo-Ukrainian war and the role of nuclear weapons in the propaganda narrative. Indeed, it became almost a carbon copy of the USA’s so-recent military venture.
American policy as a model
The recent “pre-emptive wars” in Europe (Serbia/Yugoslavia) and Asia (Iraq and Afghanistan) were predicated on Washington’s feeling of its absolute military predominance and sincere feeling of the elite that the USSR’s collapse was due not to Gorbachev’s blunders but because of the unworkability of totalitarian arrangements and superiority of the USA-type market economy and related “democracy,” free, of course, of “populist” perversions. Taking advantage of the unique geopolitical environment, the USA projected its power in all directions and was anxious to fully control the oil and gas-rich Middle East. The sense of seemingly unlimited power was so strong that some of the leading “neo-cons” did not bother even to hide the purely predatory nature of the wars.
Michael Leeden stated that “Every ten years or so, the United States had to pick up some crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business.” Robert Kagan compared Europe with a feeble and naïve Venus, who believed in trifles of international law, where the U.S. is the realistically-thinking Mars, which understands that foreign policy is based on force alone.
Some contributors to the influential Foreign Affairs even suggested that the time had come to engage in “preventive” nuclear strikes against Russia and China, too weak to respond. Still, it does not mean that Uncle Sam always appeared in public without pants, underwear, or even a fig leaf. In many cases, the propaganda machine insisted that the USA had plenty of justification for the attack. Saving the world from nuclear catastrophe was one of the major reasons for engagement. This was, for example, the case with the Iraq venture.
The Iraq war and nuclear threat
Iraq had been a good target for the USA. On the one hand, Saddam Hussein was a renowned butcher, even by Middle Eastern standards. He also invaded Kuwait. On the other hand, Iraq was oil-rich, and the Washington elite was sure that its conquest would be quite a profitable enterprise. And while the defense of Kosovo was an excuse for war against Serbia, and Bin Laden’s alleged direct involvement in the September 11 attack was the excuse for attacking Afghanistan, “the weapons of mass destruction” were the excuse for the invasion of Iraq.
The implication was that Saddam Hussein was an insane leader and would immediately use it not against their own population -the hapless Kurds- but also against anyone, e.g., Israel, Europe, and the USA. Actually, people in Washington were fully aware that Hussein had nothing. And it was the reason for the war. Indeed, with all their deep hatred of North Korea, they did not dare to strike. People in Moscow followed the American design almost to the dot.
Moscow’s Ukrainian venture
To start with, Putin would not engage Ukraine if he did not feel the “hegemon,” defeated in Afghanistan, ravaged by social and ethnic division and economic problems, was far from what it had been in the past. Putin promised that Russia would be “lifted from her knees.” It was not so much Russia’s rise as the USA’s decline that inspired him to act. Here, he followed the USA’s scenario.
East Ukraine replaced the hapless Kosovars and Ukraine forces shelling has been a slow-motion September 11. Finally, the “weapons of mass destruction” also emerged as a good excuse. It was proclaimed that Ukrainian leaders wanted to get nuclear weapons and could be nuclear powers soon enough. And this could lead to global catastrophe due to their insanity. At the same time, Moscow has been quite clear in differentiating between invented nuclear threats from real ones. And here, Moscow folks behave quite prudently, cooperating with the USA and, especially, Israel in preventing Iran from becoming nuclear.
Iran and Russia
Iran’s relationship with post-Soviet Russia has a long history. Both sides have expressed their great love for each other. Still, the reality on the ground was different. Russia had procrastinated a lot in building the Bushehr nuclear plant and delivering S-300 missiles despite the fact that Iran had pre-paid for their delivery. Iran also did not get S-400s, the advanced version, which Moscow provided to Ankara.
The delivery would have complicated Israel’s and implicitly the USA’s strikes against Iran’s nuclear plants. Russia’s relationships with Israel became especially cordial. It is true that Putin is the most Judophilic leader in Russian history, a fact usually ignored in the mainstream Western press for obvious reasons. Putin, presented as a brutal expansionist dictator, should be anti-Semitic.
Still, Moscow’s full cooperation with Israel was not due to Putin’s philosemitism but because of geopolitical pragmatism. Russia also continued to be on the same page, in general, with the USA, despite all tensions, in regard to Iranian nuclear ambitions. It is true that Raisi, the Iranian president, visited Russia recently. Still, it does not change Moscow’s approach to Iran’s nuclear program.
Like Israel, the USA, and other countries, Russia was not anxious to have a new potential edition of North Korea. Thus, Russia was similar to the USA in many ways, including its approach to weapons of mass destruction. On the one hand, the Kremlin used fake threats of spreading nuclear weapons as the way to justify aggression and do its bests to prevent a real nuclear threat to emerge.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.
